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The Week

ON the eve of the Chicago convention the Republican party is not only leaderless but without bosses. The one common interest which holds the delegates together is anti-Wilsonism. The party platform is likely to be evasive. Over the League of Nations plank there may be some dispute. We doubt whether Hiram Johnson is so irreconcilable as he proclaims himself to be. But though he may be willing to campaign on the Lodge program of reservations, if he has the chance, the strategy of his position requires that he use his own irreconcilability as the entering wedge in his fight for the nomination. He must threaten, and yet invite. His role, ever since the campaign started, has been to appear alternately before the Republicans as demon and angel.

THERE was controversy enough, when the Republican delegates assembled in Chicago; but it was controversy which had little to do with national issues before the country. No candidate belligerently demanded of his rivals, at the last moment before the gavel fell, what could be done with the railroad crisis. No delegates pursued Mr. Hays to

get his views on the unrest of labor. You might have walked the length of any corridor in the Hotel Congress without stumbling upon an indignant group of delegates asking each other what they could do with coal companies making 500 per cent profits. What held the attention of delegates, from Friday to Wednesday, was another sort of controversy. Who would fare best, in the settlement of disputes between rival state delegations? How much had Wood and Lowden been hurt by the Senate's investigation? Where ought this candidate or that one throw his support, when he was out of it, and what did he deserve to ask in return? These delegates were intent upon putting their party back in power with a winner. They gave little inclination, in the days before the convention opened, of a belief that the best way of going about it was to associate their party with a program of reconstruction.

THERE is no doubt but that in its later stages the Senate's investigation into campaign expenditures revealed facts damaging to political reputations. Lowden met his worst pre-convention setback when two delegates from Missouri took the stand; and if the Republicans nominate him anyway, the Democrats will have an issue of which they can doubtless make good use. For what happened in Missouri Lowden disowns responsibility. But it may not be easy to convince the public that he has the privilege of disowning what happens in a campaign floated on his own funds. The Missouri witnesses made a remarkable showing. Mr. Goldstein admitted denying to a reporter of the St. Louis Globe-Democrat that he had ever received \$2,500—and defended this denial on the grounds that he "knew it had been a mistake for them to offer me the money and for me to take it." Mr. Moore stated that his \$2,500 was intact in his bank account—and that he intended "to return it forthwith as a result of all this unpleasant publicity resulting from it."

ALMOST everything that mattered was either ignored or mishandled by the Congress which adjourned Saturday. That is a familiar sentence. With slight modifications it has been written at the end of every recent session. And perhaps because human patience has its border-line, each time the criticism is made it seems more honestly earned. The one major achievement of the present session likely to be permanent is the appropriation of more than four billion dollars to cover war debts and current expenditures. Congress adjourns with two issues, above all others, hanging spectacularly in mid-air. The railways are in desperate need of funds, disorganized, facing desertion on the part of their employees. In that situation Congress pretends to see no problem. Meantime the cost of living rises—and evidence furnished by the trade unions, evidence as yet uncontroverted, shows enormous profiteering in which Congress displays no interest.

EIGHTEEN months after the armistice Congress suddenly decided the war was over. A resolution was thereupon adopted, repealing all but two of the laws enacted in the war program. But this resolution the President killed by a "pocket veto." The demobilization of America has been an extraordinary performance. War activities of the government which might wisely have been continued at least into the transition period were promptly abandoned. The Food Administration was abolished; prices rose, and sugar disappeared from the market. The War Labor Board was dissolved; there is more need for it now than ever. The railways were returned to private ownership; they are disorganized and badly in need of credit. Meantime there has been kept on the statute books a law designed primarily to protect us from German spies—and though the war with Germany is long since over, prosecutions of "radicals" continue to be made under its terms. The Espionage law, thanks to Mr. Wilson, will now remain with us another six months at least.

AMONG the measures which were lost, in the final adjournment of Congress, was the patched-up bill for a budget system which the President had originally vetoed. Mr. Wilson had declared himself in sympathy with the general terms of the measure, but opposed to one section vesting in Congress alone the power to remove from office a Controller General and his Assistant, both appointed by the President. The House came close to passing the bill over Mr. Wilson's veto, but failed by nine votes. The Republicans in the House thereupon yielded to the President's objections, and passed

the measure in the form he desired it. But in the Senate it struck a snag. There were other bills which had precedence, and the Senate adjourned before it got to this one. The Republicans have long been promising a budget. They made a late start in the session now adjourned.

THE British House of Commons, cross-questioning Lloyd George, had to be satisfied with a somewhat meagre account of the discussions that have taken place between his government and Gregory Krassin, Soviet Minister of Trade and Commerce. Lloyd George assured the House that no trade negotiations had been begun, and that none might be begun at all unless the Soviet government supplied satisfactory guarantees of its pacific intentions in the East and its willingness to release all British prisoners. This is what Lloyd George tells the House—but some of the London journals are certain it is not the whole story. The Evening Standard states that permission has been given the Soviets to open a central trading office in London; the Daily Mail reports that this bureau will work in cooperation with the Board of Overseas Trade; and several journals announce that Krassin has already received permission to deposit gold to the value of 1,000,000 pounds in a London bank.

WHETHER or not the newspapers are right, and Lloyd George only diplomatically discreet in his remarks before the House, the reports published in London create a stir in the Paris press. What causes most perturbation is the rumor that a million pounds in gold has been brought to London. The rift in Anglo-French relations, cables Lincoln Eyre to the New York World, "threatens to become an abyss which the engineers of diplomacy will find it difficult to bridge over." If, with the approval of the British government, Krassin keeps on bringing gold from Moscow to London, what becomes of the security upon which France still relies for the redemption of fifteen billion francs in Russian bonds? Fifteen billion francs is not a colossal sum, in the terms to which we have recently grown accustomed. But fifteen billion francs in Russian bonds has determined every phase of French policy in Eastern Europe. Reject any plan which would touch Russia's store of gold or which would involve political negotiations with the Moscow government—those are the instructions which the French government gives to its representative on the Allied Economic Council.

WHILE the French protest, and Lloyd George marks time, it seems that some of the smaller nations are actually on the point of putting their

heads in the lion's mouth. The Norwegian government, with the approval of its Parliament, has informed Russia of its willingness to resume commercial relations at once, though it will extend no official recognition to the Soviets; meantime firms in Denmark are reported to have sold for early delivery in Russia large quantities of agricultural implements, seeds, and medical supplies. In this question of agreeing upon a commercial policy towards Russia what is to be the American position? We shall probably have "an unofficial observer" at the conference in London, says a dispatch to the New York World. But whatever the result in London, says the Washington correspondent of the Times, "it was reiterated in a high quarter today that the American government is maintaining its position of opposition to reopening of trade with Russia, so long as the Soviet leaders are in power." If this is the American policy, on what is our government banking—the Polish offensive or a revolution on the inside of Russia?

ELSEWHERE in this issue there are passages quoted from an interview given to the London Daily Chronicle by General Jan Smuts. Most of what General Smuts said was concerned with a state of Europe and the paralysis of the League of Nations; a part of his interview, however, was devoted to "the fundamental constitutional changes brought about by the war in the British Commonwealth." "The old pre-war British Empire is gone," he asserted, "in the sense of subordinate nations clustering around one master nation. Unfortunately the old machinery still remains." Only upon one foundation can the British Commonwealth endure: "there must be complete equality and freedom enjoyed by the sister states united by the King." Smuts is not for separation, though he says, "they are not all mad, the Nationalists;" instead, "your constitutional problem is to find new formulas to fit new conditions." It is more than likely that to the Imperial Constitutional Conference next year Smuts will bring such formulas of his own.

IN the gardens of Versailles a third treaty of peace is signed by the Allied plenipotentiaries—this time with the diplomats of Hungary. Peace, officially, is thus restored to the Hungarian people. But despite what is written on paper in Versailles, Hungary knows no peace. By friends of the old regime, again supreme in the eastern half of the old Austro-Hungarian empire, it is repeatedly asserted that in Hungary there is no White Terror. By a neutral source, however, we are informed that such a Terror is still in progress. The International

Federation of Trade Unions appeals to the British workmen to boycott Hungary and shut off communication with that country. Since Admiral Horthy and the reactionaries overpowered Hungary, says a dispatch to the New York World, quoting the Federation, trade unionists have been subjected to unparalleled persecution. Thousands of working men and women have been imprisoned. Many have been murdered by the officers' clique without trial. In Russia the Red Terror has waned; in Hungary the White Terror still rages; but of the White Terrorists the Allied diplomats have no fear in making peace.

WHEN production lags, as it is lagging now, there are many people ready with the same explanation. Strikes, they say, cause the mischief. But strikes, in the opinion of a government official whose business it is to examine all manner of industrial phenomena, are an insignificant factor in the curtailment of production. This official is Royal Meeker, Commissioner of Labor Statistics. In Dr. Meeker's opinion, "Strikes and lockouts have contributed their thousands to the ranks of the out-of-workers; but irregularities and failure in supply of raw materials, transportation, and demand for commodities produced, and lack of proper organization in industry, have produced their millions." Hearings before the President's coal commission disclosed how ineffectively an essential industry can be organized for maximum productivity. An even greater waste is that which comes from failure to make use of the tremendous latent creative force lying dormant in the American worker.

WITH the House of Representatives voting to pass a soldiers' bonus bill carrying \$1,500,000,000, shortly before its adjournment for the summer months, there is a special lesson for American taxpayers in a set of figures recently compiled by Dr. Edward B. Rosa, chief physicist of the Bureau of Standards. Dr. Rosa has sorted out the various items in recent appropriation bills and arranged them, as Congress never does, in consecutive fashion. The results are impressive. During the year just passed, war debts took almost 93 per cent of the largest income ever received since the government was founded. An additional 6 per cent went to the normal expenses of administration and to public works [rivers and harbors, public buildings, etc.]. And just 1 per cent was left for research and investigation. What of that field now so important—the field of labor research? It received appropriations of about \$500,000—one three-thousandth part of what the House of Representatives proposed to expend for the soldiers' bonus.

The Work of the Next President

NO wonder Americans compete keenly for the honor of being President of the United States. The man who occupies the Presidential chair enjoys in his own person more of the realities of power than does the chief of any other government in the world today. The office affords a unique opportunity for winning popular applause and public reputation, for cutting a smart figure in history and for exercising either for good or ill a profound and far-reaching effect on the lives of other people. Strong, ambitious and wilful men are bound to seek the Presidency, just as they have always sought similarly extraordinary prizes of politics, yet precisely because such immense power attaches to the office, they have small chance of emerging from it with credit to themselves and with benefit to the country. The Presidency of the United States is no longer the moderate, well-defined and man-sized job which it was during the first three generations of American history. It has come to be an impossible office. The man who fills it carries a heavier burden of responsibility, of work and of authority than any one man can successfully bear.

The excessive burden of responsibility is imposed upon him not by law but by the exigencies of his situation. During a period of transition and readjustment a republic with a localized population and a three-headed government has demanded vigorous leadership, which would both pull the several branches of the government together and keep it as a whole responsive to public opinion. Yet while circumstances rather than the law have imposed this additional burden on the President, the Constitution effectively prohibits him from creating supplementary agencies, which will help him adequately to carry it. Under the Constitution he must assume entire and exclusive responsibility for an executive office which has ceased to be that of chief administrator of the laws and business of the nation and has become also the chief source to which the American people turn for the moulding of foreign policy, for initiating domestic legislation, for the definition of critical issues and for the focussing of opinion. For many years the work has over-tasked the energy, the endurance and the ability of the men who were elected President, and the end is not yet. The victorious candidate at the election next fall will need even more than have his predecessors for the successful conduct of the office, indefatigable energy, iron endurance, immense versatility and a rare mixture of flexibility and persistence in his point of view.

It was the late Theodore Roosevelt who transformed and developed the business of being President. When he succeeded McKinley, the President was still chiefly an executive officer, who took orders from his party and from Congress. Important as the President's work was, the chief responsibility for defining issues, originating and carrying out policy and for moulding public opinion resided in Congress and in the party organization. Mr. Roosevelt upset this balance and distribution of power. He proposed to secure the passage of progressive legislation to which Congress and the organization of his party were opposed. He succeeded in part by going behind Congress and the party leaders directly to the people; and as a consequence of his success he impaired the prestige of Congress and the Republican machine and tended to centralize in the Presidency the function of giving impulse to the governmental machine, of moulding public opinion and of placing before the people the important issues.

His successor, Mr. Taft, proved incapable either of acting on these new responsibilities or of abandoning them. He tried to do both and he ended by doing neither. He pretended to lead a party organization which was really leading him by the nose, and he caused an insurrection in Congress not because he sought to dominate its behavior but because he allowed its less progressive faction too free a hand. The resulting quarrel seriously undermined the unity of the Republican party and did nothing to restore to Congress its former pre-eminence in the effective distribution of political power among the several branches of the government. President Wilson had every intention of restoring the balance, of asserting his leadership yet of keeping it subordinate to the will of his party and that of Congress. But he has ended by imposing on his fellow Democrats a policy in which they do not believe and by engaging in a destructive fight with the Republican majority in Congress. American entrance into the war conferred on the Presidential office a prodigious increase in power and work against which Mr. Wilson struggled successfully for a while, but which finally proved too much for him. In December, 1918, he abandoned his former initiative in domestic policy to Congress in order to leave himself free to pacify the world. But he did not pacify the world and Congress proved incapable of taking over the abandoned initiative. Because he ceased to act as leader, the American people are entering on a Presidential campaign with an unusually ambiguous definition of issues and with no illuminating focussing of opinion.

The next President will assume a work of huge and incalculable difficulty which he will have to

handle by means of inadequate instruments. A disheartening array of knotty, slippery and exasperating questions of domestic and foreign policy will confront him. He will have to make peace not only with Germany but with the whole of Europe, and he will have to do so in spite of the fact that he is tied to a system of national economics which, considering the indebtedness of Europe to the United States, creates a sharp conflict of equally legitimate interests between the two continents. The making of permanent peace will involve a readjustment of economic and political relations between the old and the new world which is incompatible with many cherished American traditions. Scarcely less immediate and formidable will be the devising of a Mexican policy which, without violating the promises of the Republican party, will help to restore peace and prosperity to Mexico, and which will not involve the new administration in the disastrously expensive enterprise of unlimited military intervention. For the expense of Mexican intervention would add an impossible burden to the already exhausted pack horse of American domestic finance.

When the new President assumes office he will take over the operation of a groaning and creaking fiscal economic and political machine, one which in many essential functions is clearly breaking down. At a critical moment when the nation needs above everything else abundance of production, the mechanism and motives which supplied in the past a sufficient volume of economic goods no longer work. The resulting congestion and deprivation have injected into the social system a poison which breaks out into many ugly sores and much nervous irritation. American industry cannot obtain the capital which it needs or the labor or the transport or the confidence in the future. It cannot resume operations until the impediments to production are removed, partly by international action, partly by drastic social changes, partly by reaching an understanding with labor and partly by political reconstruction. During the first year or two of his administration the new President will have to do something or propose to do something about all these running sores.

Yet neither he himself, nor his party, nor public opinion will have qualified themselves to consider questions of this magnitude and complication and immense difficulty. The political instructors of the American people have taught them to believe that the fathers of the Republic solved the fundamental political problems of the American state and society and that when the nation gets into apparent trouble it should cling confidently and blindly to the Constitution and hope for the best. This is the way

many of the best brains in America behaved previous to the Civil War and this is the behavior which still instinctively commends itself to the American spirit. Americans prefer to attribute their troubles to the agitation of malevolent men, to overlook or to forget the full seriousness of their situation and to wait until a crisis occurs, not only to act but to begin the preparation of public opinion for action. The most unmanageable difficulties of the new President will flow less from the inability to propose promising lines of remedial policy than from the inevitable popular hostility which he will arouse by insisting on any policy sufficiently thorough-going to start the disabled machine going again. American public opinion is not only deeply divided about the policy which should be adopted to cope with the political and economic breakdown, but, apart from its left and its right wings, it still refuses to admit the existence of dangers which it cannot avoid just as in 1916 it refused to recognize how fundamental were the American interests which were involved by the European war. Finally, when the crisis comes to a head and action must be taken, the new President cannot override opposition as Mr. Wilson could and did in 1917, by calling on the American people to put aside their dissensions and rally to their flag. When he has to act he is more than likely to run into a deadlock with the less alert and mobile Congress and public opinion. The very patriotic pressure which Mr. Wilson used to force the American people into the war reacted against him when he tried to force upon them a doubtful peace.

We do not envy the man whom the voters next fall will elect to the Presidency. No matter how able, disinterested and energetic he may be, his administration will succeed only by virtue of a miracle. The necessary business of trying and laboring and failing will try his temper and his self-possession as severely as the fortunes of the past year have tried the temper and the self-possession of President Wilson. It is a rare and wonderful personal triumph for any man to have a nation of one hundred million people select him for their captain and superficially to give him almost as much authority as the captain exercises upon a ship, but the triumph wears a more dubious look when the vessel is leaking, when the deck hands are mutinous, when the passengers are uncomfortable and discontented and when in the end the captain's responsibility far exceeds the effective scope of his authority.

Something of this kind will happen to our new President. During the last fifteen years the federal government and the President, as the most active and vigilant branch of the federal government, have taken over one additional responsibility after

another until almost all the wires of political authority in the United States run sooner or later into the White House. But in the meantime we have not introduced improvements in the structure of the government corresponding to these changes in function—improvements which secure for the President the assistance and support needed to redeem the increased responsibilities. He has become the chief law-giver but without a majority in the legislature, a political premier with nothing but clerks for colleagues, a fountain of policy without any pool at the source in which the abundant waters can collect, and the brains of a great nation without any time for thought.

Of course, it will not last. Since the American nation cannot find a king among men wise and benevolent enough to fill the office of President, they will have to shrink the responsibilities of the office to man-sized limits. Just how they can bring this shrinkage about will not be easy to decide. The most obvious method would be to follow the English precedent and take over some form of parliamentary or cabinet government, but if this method were tried, it would involve not only a constitutional amendment but a reconstruction of the machinery of government for which public opinion is wholly unprepared. In all probability, consequently, some President in the near future will propose a less drastic plan. He will try to distribute his responsibilities and secure the assistance and support which he needs by selecting his cabinet from Congress and by trying to get Congress to admit them to the floor of the House or the Senate. But there are grave objections to this compromise as long as both Congress and the President derive their powers directly from the people under conditions which prevent either of them from representing the same impulses in public opinion. Neither one will permanently yield to the other. If they are to work together, they must both be subordinated as they were from 1830 to 1904, to the higher authority of a united party, and at present neither party is sufficiently united to force cooperation on the Presidency and Congress. In our opinion the American nation can obtain a sufficiently powerful and authoritative machinery to deal with its present difficulties only by one of two methods. One is by the development of a national party sufficiently numerous, sufficiently well-informed and sufficiently united really to govern the country. The other is by the summoning of a new constitutional convention called together and selected expressly for the purpose of making those changes in the political and economic organization which neither the President nor Congress nor the existing parties seem capable of bringing about.

A Sedition Plank for the Republicans

WE have not seen the Republican platform. We go to press when there are only tentative drafts and the prophecies of the newspaper correspondents. The Mexican plank, say some of the reporters, has been written by Senator Fall. This sounds like old times—though there may be some doubt whether Mr. Fall can drive through the Republican convention anything quite so plain-spoken as his proposal that Mexico either revise her constitution to meet the demands of American oil interests or else compose herself for an American invasion. Other planks in the Republican platform will not require as much attention as this one will possibly need—such planks, for instance, as that one opposing government ownership in all its forms, that one pledging the party to expansion of the Rural Free Delivery, and that one registering opposition to Bolshevism. Over the precise form a tariff plank should take, there may be more than the usual debate. And Hiram Johnson, we may be sure, will make as much trouble as he can for those who want to go lightly on the League of Nations.

Of the material prepared for the Republican platform by anyone in authority within that party, and made public in the days preceding the convention, the most interesting document we have seen comes from a subcommittee headed by ex-Senator Albert J. Beveridge. This document is a report on the advisability of enacting further legislation for the purpose of curbing "peace-time sedition."

There was a day, not long ago, when Nicholas Murray Butler sounded a key-note for many Republicans by declaring, "we must repeat the great demonstration of 1917 and summon the resources of America not for war overseas, but for a war at home." In this mood a large and responsible faction of the Republican party organization has proceeded, both in Congress and in the states. The obvious case is the spirited attack upon democratic institutions made by the legislature of New York. Under Republican leadership, and by virtue chiefly of Republican votes, a coterie of the Old Guard put through the legislature a program of repressive measures creating a state bureau of espionage, barring Socialists from public office, etc. Only the veto of a Democratic governor kept such a measure from becoming law. What a Republican legislature planned for New York was perhaps matched nowhere else in the country. But in other states—Pennsylvania, for instance, and California—Republican legislatures have written laws ostensibly in the interest of law and order, but actually the

result of persuasion exercised by powerful reactionaries or the clamor raised by a less sophisticated press.

In Washington there has been evidence of the same insistence on the part of Republicans to write more laws, and still more, for the restriction of individual liberty of thought. Witness the Sterling bill, coming from a Republican committee, the many other bills of a similar character introduced with Republican support, and finally the Johnson bill—adopted last week on the final day of the session and immediately approved by the President. "With this bill on the statute books," declares the Republican chairman of the Immigration Committee in the House, "more will have been done to clean up the vicious aliens in this country than any legislation that has been proposed. The act means that these foreign revolutions shall not preach their doctrines, circulate their literature or contribute their money for these purposes." Membership in the I. W. W., the Communist party or the Communist Labor party is automatically made sufficient grounds for the deportation of alien residents, though the individual alien may in every respect be a law-abiding member of his community. Political heresy, not the commission of an act of violence, is the test upon which this law relies.

What does Senator Beveridge's subcommittee recommend to the Republican convention in the way of new peace-time sedition laws? Not legislation of the sort which Republicans have brought into Congress and into the state legislatures, and occasionally—with the help of Democrats, as in this case—made into law. The report of Senator Beveridge's subcommittee, written before Congress passed the Johnson bill on the day of its adjournment, maintains that the present criminal code is adequate to punish all treasonable acts in time of peace. This opinion is predicated upon the policy of the common law and the general policy in criminal legislation which makes acts themselves directly injurious to the state the test of criminality. The subcommittee urges the enactment of legislation to make possible the intervention of the federal courts in cases of the deportation of undesirable aliens.

"In view of the large numbers of people affected by the immigration acts," says its report, "and in view of the constant extension of the category of deportable offenses, and of the vigorous malpractice of the Departments of Justice and Labor, it is urged that intervention of the courts be made more possible and requisite." Finally, the subcommittee points out the unwisdom of any attempt to legislate as criminal mere opinions or membership in organizations not themselves criminal, which do not

involve the commission of or the solicitation to commit criminal acts.

No federal law has yet declared the I. W. W., the Communist party, or the Communist Labor party in itself a criminal organization. To that degree, passage of the Johnson bill runs counter to the advice which an official Republican committee supplies to the Convention. The Johnson bill, however, is by no means so flagrantly in contradiction to Senator Beveridge's report as is such legislation as the Lusk bills. Will the Republican Convention, after the passage of the Johnson bill, call a halt upon the enactment of peace-time sedition laws and write into its platform the planks that come from Senator Beveridge? There are fire-eaters to whom such temporizing with democracy will be obnoxious. They have been in the saddle the past two years. Perhaps they will stay there, for the present at least. Even so, Senator Beveridge's committee has read a useful lesson to the party. We offer it our congratulations.

The New Merchant Marine Act

THE Merchant Marine act is the one notable achievement of the late Congressional session. It opens up a vista of problems and possibilities for the future which it is not too early to be considering.

The bill is a complete victory for those who have resisted the cry (popular among business men and Republican politicians) for the immediate sale of the government's merchant fleet. No one familiar with the facts can ever have supposed that such a policy was possible. To dump 10,000,000 dead-weight tons of shipping on the American maritime market, was a policy that may have been attractive to prospective purchasers and ship speculators, but that was obviously fantastic from the point of view both of government finance and of the sound development of a merchant marine. Yet as exalted an authority as Chairman Hurley of the Shipping Board, and as representative a body as the merchant marine committee of the United States Chamber of Commerce were for a while carried away by the current delusion. That the new merchant marine bill has steered clear of this dangerous policy of forced sale is due mainly to the wisdom and persistence of Senator Jones, the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Commerce, to whom the best parts of the new law owe their authorship.

Instead of decreeing an immediate sale at sacrifice prices, the new merchant marine act, while accepting the policy of ultimate private ownership, leaves to the Shipping Board a large discretion as to the time, price and terms at which the ships are

to be sold. There are to be no bargain counter sales. In fixing sale prices, the board is to take into consideration any "facts or conditions that would influence a prudent, solvent business man in the sale of similar vessels or property which he is not forced to sell." In the meantime the board has full authority to operate, charter or lease the vessels, and the life of the Emergency Fleet Corporation, the board's operating agency, has been indefinitely extended until the last ship is sold. The board is furthermore authorized to investigate what new steamship lines are desirable for the promotion of American commerce, and to arrange with private companies, if possible, otherwise by government operation, for the establishment of such lines.

The law will put the Shipping Board to its greatest test. The problems with which it will be confronted are enormously difficult and delicate. The financial details of the sale will be the least of its difficulties. Over the allocation of ships to existing companies, and the establishment of new lines from American ports to foreign markets, the law necessarily leaves to the board a latitude of discretion under which it can make or mar the American merchant marine. In exercising this discretion it will be exposed to every kind of pressure, sectional, political, industrial. Maritime interests, insurance interests, exporters and importers, dealers in fuel and supplies, all will have their axes to grind, and all will endeavor by political wirepulling and propaganda to obtain special advantages. The South will claim that the board is under the domination of a New York shipping ring, and New York will claim that its maritime interests are being sacrificed to favored ports in the South. Disappointed would-be purchasers of ships will cry graft and favoritism. Professional anti-English propagandists will denounce the board for subservience to British interests. It will be exposed to every cross current of private and sectional interest. To steer a straight course will call for the highest character and statesmanship.

Hence even more depends upon the men who are going to administer the new law than upon its detailed terms. Nominally the old Shipping Board consisted of five members. There are now two vacancies, and a third member has announced his impending resignation. The new law increases the membership to seven. Five new members must, therefore, be appointed in the near future. Upon these new appointments the success or failure of the law will depend. As to their qualifications, Senator Jones put the matter succinctly in his report:

We should have men on the Shipping Board who know the shipping business, who can meet those dealing with the board on their own ground, and who can anti-

cipate the moves and methods of our competitors. Men of character and standing can be depended upon to take better care of the interests of the government in matters with which they are experienced than can men who are ignorant of such needs and without such experience. There is more danger of loss, injury or failure through mistaken action than through improper action.

That is the very opposite of the theory upon which President Wilson has gone in making his appointments in the past, yet it is the only theory upon which a sound merchant marine policy can be administered.

A Statesman Diagnoses Europe

ONCE again General Jan Smuts shows himself a statesman with a clear eye, a deep devotion to his ideals, and a readiness to speak what seems to him the truth. In those qualities there has in recent years been no political leader in western Europe or America to match him.

The most recent statement from General Smuts comes in the form of an interview which he grants to the correspondent of the London Daily Chronicle at Cape Town. He sees at work in Europe the same forces of disintegration against which he warned his colleagues once when the Treaty was signed and again when he sailed for Africa. "France, without the assent of her partners in the alliance, adopts most drastic military measures against Germany, calculated, one could suppose, to destroy the last vestige of government and bring her to the condition of Russia." Farther east another war still rages. Alone with Lord Robert Cecil, among all Allied statesmen, General Smuts makes open protest against Poland's invasion into Russia. He lacks the complacency which enables Mr. Wilson to overlook the fact that the League of Nations does not even attempt to curb aggression on the part of one of its own members. "Here is Poland, starving, kept going by foreign loans, making war on Soviet Russia. Formerly Poland was crushed between the upper and nether millstones of Germany and Russia. Today her imperialist action invites a repetition of the old process. At San Remo you have conferences going on to resume trade relations with Russia, which are declared to be necessary for the safety of Europe. In Poland you have Marshal Pilsudski making war on Russia, though large parts of Poland are starving and typhus is raging. . . . You cannot defeat Russia. Napoleon learned that lesson, and now Denikin and Kolchak have learned it, too. Sooner or later Pilsudski will likewise learn the lesson." In fact, Poland's advance into Russia is likely to have an effect quite the reverse of what Polish statesmen hope it

will have. "From this distance," says General Smuts, "I gather that Bolshevism is moderating its violence. One cannot always be mad. There must come a time when the fiercest fires die down. But the way to revive Bolshevism, to rally all Russia to the Soviet government, is to invade the country and annex large slices of it. French missions and American munitions apparently enable Poland to carry on her offensive for the present. What do the great Powers do? Nothing but shrug their shoulders."

For the League of Nations that might have dominated the politics of Europe, no man toiled more earnestly than General Smuts. In America many of the friends of the League are recent converts. There are members of Congress, for instance, who were utterly indifferent to the League in any form whatever until it became a serviceable political issue. Smuts was fighting for a League when many of those men would have spurned him with the curt declaration that neither in Europe's war nor Europe's peace did we have a share of interest. It was in plans drawn by this South African soldier that Mr. Wilson found ideas for the first draft of his Covenant.

Today Smuts sees no evidence that the League is functioning as that moderating force, upon the Treaty and its makers, which many Americans like to think it may become. He seems, in fact, to regard it as a creature of the European imperialists, and not their moderator. What has it done in Eastern Europe? In the opinion of General Smuts, "It ought to have said to Poland: 'This cannot be.' It ought to have prevented these operations. And yet the official answer in the House of Commons is: 'This is not a new war, but the old one. Great Britain was not consulted, and it is not a case for the League to interfere.' Who, then, is to interfere? Poland is an Ally member of the League of Nations and yet cannot be checked in this enterprise."

Whether General Smuts believes the addition of the United States to the councils of the League would have a moderating influence upon a body displaying so little moderation, he does not say. He believes that we are contributing munitions to the Polish offensive, and he is of course aware that this country has publicly made no effort—an effort to which it was entitled regardless of its failure to enter the League—to halt a manoeuvre which embroils Eastern Europe in war. "I am apprehensive," he says, "I see only chaos in all this, no authority or restraint. Old empires have disappeared. At least they kept smaller nations in order. There is nothing to put in their place, *for the great Powers see to it that the League has no vital force behind it.* Are the statesmen in

Europe really deeply in earnest about the chaos to which the Old World is drifting?"

The great Powers make the League an unreality. There is danger, so long as the politics of the Old World are motivated by imperialism, that participation by the New will not so much moderate as make possible of realization the present objectives of ruling European statesmen. There is neither explicit approval nor disapproval—but only understanding—in what General Smuts says of the desires of his own land: "This country does not wish to be selfish, but it wants to keep away from European entanglements."

What Shall Be Done with Mexico?

MEXICO, we ought to remember, is a sovereign state. Under the principles of international law, for whose vindication we fought on European soil, Mexico has a right to live under any form of constitution to her liking. The Fall report, with its insistence upon the amendment of the Mexican constitution to meet the desires of American "missionaries, ministers, preachers, teachers" and especially of Americans who hold rights of property heretofore acquired "or which may hereafter be acquired," is formally a piece of arrogance and impudence that can hardly be matched even by the manifestoes of the German Fatherland party in the days when they anticipated complete victory. The explicit promise of reward in the shape of a loan if our behests are obeyed and the threat of invasion if they are disregarded add nothing to the insolence of the general proceeding. Without them it was already made plain that there are Americans in responsible positions who have learned no lesson in international manners from the downfall of Germany.

But while the Fall policy toward Mexico is intolerable, and cannot be officially applied without dishonor by a nation which professes adherence to principles of international law and justice, applicable alike to the greater and the lesser peoples, neither is a policy of hands off practical or even morally tenable. The whole world knows that American-Mexican relations are always in a state of unstable equilibrium. On the Mexican side of the line are colossal natural riches and on the American side of the line colossal natural cupidities. Only a trifling minority of Americans, to be sure, thirst for Mexican wealth, but that minority is ceaselessly active, with intrigue and propaganda, while the rest of us turn our eyes to other things. If in Mexico one revolution must succeed another, with one fac-

tion or the other usually deriving aid from American concessionary interests, and always with incidental destruction of American property and loss of American lives, an occasion for intervention and conquest capable of being made popular will surely arise, sooner or later. Mexico may escape intervention through four years even of Republican administration, since the American people are sick of soldiering and war debts. It is not safe, however, to bank on that. The era of Mexican revolutions can certainly not prolong itself through a generation without bringing on intervention, and virtual annexation.

The danger of war upon Mexico would not be so great if the movement toward intervention were actuated by gross cupidity alone. It is not. Under modern conditions no people can claim the absolute right to do what it wills with its own. There are alien interests under the shadow of every national sovereignty, and those interests can not be ruthlessly disregarded. The United States is not, to be sure, a paragon of virtue in the handling of alien interests. We have permitted repudiation, confiscation through taxation, discrimination as between the nationals of different Powers, and have fallen back upon our peculiar Constitution as sufficient explanation and justification. Nevertheless, alien interests are usually quite safe with us, and we are justified in expecting a fair measure of safety for our interests abroad. We can not in decency ask a foreign nation to alter its fundamental law in deference to the interests of our nationals, but we can ask fair pecuniary compensation when those interests are seriously impaired. Mexico may properly assert inalienable national ownership of the subsoil. Probably all well regulated states will eventually do the same. But it is not good international morality, still less wise international policy, to deprive Americans or other aliens, without fair compensation, of subsoil rights heretofore legitimately acquired.

If Mexico and the United States are to escape the scandal and suffering of an intervention which would inevitably mean war, there must be an early end to the epoch of revolution. There must also be a satisfactory definition of permitted alien interests, and adequate protection for them. The United States has the right and duty to concern itself in these questions. But because the United States contains within it powerful interests aiming at annexation, formal or informal, it is impossible to act alone without arousing suspicion of ulterior motives. America might in the best of faith recognize the provisional government of de la Huerta, or the elected government that succeeds it. She might support that government with loans and with favor-

able commercial arrangements. But that might merely bring upon the government the charge of being sold out to the Gringos. Thus in seeking to strengthen a regime that promised well for national order and international peace we might merely have weakened its hold upon the people.

Clearly, the case is one for international, not national action. And since by the terms of the Covenant the jurisdiction of the League does not apply, the reasonable course for the United States to pursue would obviously be to call a conference of the nations of America. Let the whole of America decide when any government established in Mexico is sufficiently stable to merit recognition. What conditions should be laid down in respect to alien interests ought to be defined by common consent. If a loan were required for placing the Mexican government on a sound footing, it ought to be a common enterprise of the American states.

By such an appeal to American internationalism we might not secure such prompt redress of our Mexican grievances as we could by throwing an army across the border. We should, however, secure adequate redress in the end, and we should secure something vastly more important, the dispelling of the belief throughout Latin America that the imperialistic ambitions of the United States are a menace to all the New World. And we should have proved to the Old World that we desire peace and the amicable adjustment of international relations not only on the Rhine, in the Balkans and the Levant, where there is nothing any American cares to grab, but at our own doors, where vast riches beckon to the American exploiter. We should have made Pan-Americanism a reality instead of a vague ideal. We should have established, in an epoch of war and disintegration, a substantial precedent for peace and mutual aid among nations.

The New **REPUBLIC** *A Journal of Opinion*

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America and the Soviets

THE policy of the Allies toward Soviet Russia is at last to undergo the formal revision which has long been inevitable. Krassin, arriving in London to discuss the resumption of trade—ostensibly on behalf of the cooperatives but in reality, of course, for the Soviet government—announced at once that he was to deal, not with England, but with all the Allies, “in accordance with the decision of the San Remo conference.” To this the Allies respond with the silence which is tacit endorsement. France, as was to be expected, at once launched a barrage of propaganda. She first sought Krassin’s arrest at Copenhagen, then discovered a Red plot to overthrow her government (via the usual Amsterdam-and-jewels route), then insisted Russia shall use none of the “stolen gold” which belongs to the Tsar’s creditors, then announced her representative would be present at all meetings. America also will have an “observer” present; Italy, like England, has been preparing for months to capture as much as possible of the new Russian trade. The Norwegian government, with her Parliament’s approval, has asked Soviet Russia to resume commercial relations at once.

The theory that the Allies’ sudden friendliness is due to Russian military successes in the near-east is of course nonsense; the new policy was determined long before these successes became a reality. That the Bolshevik commissioner should be received in London is, as a matter of fact, a triumph resulting from a trilogy of forces. In part it is caused by Italian influence at San Remo; in part it is a stale and shabby triumph for Lloyd George at the end of eighteen months during which he let Pichon, Clemenceau and Churchill persuade him against his own morality to a policy as stupid as it was venomous. But more important than either of these factors, apparently, is the clever game of propaganda played by Krassin and his companions from Copenhagen, duplicating on a larger scale the skilful and successful efforts of L. C. A. K. Martens in America.

The Bolshevik commission, arriving in Denmark, promptly dangled before the eyes of European capitalists the sight of—money. They wanted to buy all sorts of things; they would pay all sorts of prices. And in truth, they did buy from Danish business men large quantities of vegetable seeds, medical supplies, agricultural machinery and machine tools. But when English salesmen arrived on the scene, in a perspiration of covetousness, they were met, according to the Danish press reports,

with a very cold shoulder. How, they were asked, could Soviet Russia buy from representatives of the nations which still maintain the inhuman cordon “sanitaire”; whose warships still patrol the Baltic and prevent the delivery, not only of goods from England but even the newly-purchased Danish products?

The application of this logic has undoubtedly hastened the dawn. Aided by the pressure exerted by the British Labor party, the Italian Socialists, and the semi-friendly League of Nations (one of whose first official acts as a separate entity was to invite Lenin to permit it to send a commission to Russia), Krassin’s diplomacy has in all human probability turned the trick at last. We can only conjecture with what countenances the communists at Moscow have heard how “capitalist greed” has at last been invoked successfully when appeals to human decency were so long launched in vain.

With the end of the Allies’ heroically stupid and tragic misadventure at last in sight, it becomes possible to point out a misapprehension widely held in America regarding the recent attitude of our own government toward Russia. For the first seven months of the President’s illness, the State Department was forced to function on its own responsibility concerning Russia, as concerning everything else; and there is no reason to believe that this situation has been changed to the present day. Messrs. Lansing, Polk and Colby could not, naturally, initiate and publicly announce a policy which would depart radically from Mr. Wilson’s; but there is good reason to believe that in its secret intercourse with the other Allied governments the State Department has been far more broad-minded than American liberals have conceded. I am convinced that when all the facts are made public, if they ever are, it will be found that our government has attempted repeatedly during the past four or five months, to persuade the Supreme Council to abandon the blockade of Russia. I am also convinced that unless President Wilson should indulge himself in the aberrant stubbornness of a sick man, the United States will resume complete economic relations with Russia in the very near future. We may wait a month or two for concerted action by the Allies, so obviously preferable; but if by an unlikely mischance the French influence should again gain the ascendancy and continue the past brutal attitude, then I feel sure that this country will break away from the alliance on this one question at least, and remove all the barriers at a stroke. Shippers

will be allowed to export cargoes for Russia, though at their own risk; passports will be freely issued for countries whence movement into Russia is now fairly easy; postal arrangements will be made. These things can be done without formal recognition of the Soviet government which will probably come much later.

That the anti-Bolshevist elements in Europe and America are aware of the impending change in the attitude of the Allies, and particularly America, seems very clear from the sudden burst of energy with which they have renewed their propaganda. From London, from Paris, and most familiar of all, from Copenhagen, comes the usual bombardment. The Soviet government is tottering once more—or, if you prefer, as usual. The Paris correspondent of the New York Times is informed confidentially that it cannot last another six months. The Italian representative who visited Russia lately has returned home "greatly disheartened." Colonel Ryan of the Red Cross finds the streets of Moscow filled with filth which in some places is neck-deep—a singular condition for a capital carrying on such an extensive military campaign as that against the Poles! The other day, Brusiloff had formed a military dictatorship. Just before that, the wireless went silent which was cheerfully interpreted as meaning a successful counter-revolution. Before that it was the Polish drive. Before that it was Denikin. Before him, Yudenitch. Before him, Kolchak. Before him, the Archangel expedition. Before that, the Japanese-Allied expedition at Vladivostok. Incidentally, regarding this last we learn from the new Russian-American documents just published (June 5th) by the League of Free Nations Association, that the British, American and Japanese governments were aware that its pretext—the presence in Siberia of great numbers of armed German prisoners—had no foundation in fact. But why trace again a circle already so well-worn?

It may be urged in contradiction of my interpretation of our State Department, that for the past seven months and longer it has continued to publish the most absurd reports of conditions in Russia, it has suppressed the Soviet government's peace offers, it has refused export licenses and passports. All true; but not incompatible with the efforts I believe it has made and is now making.

The State Department has certainly never nursed a secret sympathy with the Bolsheviki. It has published every fact and alleged fact of an inimical character it could get; it has adhered strictly to the policy of the Allies, which was also—and much more than his admirers have admitted—President Wilson's policy before he was cut down.

But its hostility to the Bolshevist government has been a defensive not an aggressive hostility, for two reasons. The first is that American tradition is all on the side of a struggling nation which has just thrown off the tyrant's yoke through revolution. When we are not hysterical, we remember this, and as the war hysteria died away the State Department began to hear this deep under-note, to which Senator Johnson was the only statesman shrewd enough to vibrate in public.

The second reason is the amazingly skilful propaganda of Ludwig C. A. K. Martens, whose abilities have been much underrated by his opponents. Mr. Martens has gone up and down the land doing on a smaller scale what Krassin has just done at Copenhagen—making the capitalists' mouths water. He has bought—bought shoes, bought machinery, bought manufactured goods of every sort. He has promised to pay in gold, at prices high enough to yield a handsome profit. Then, just as the American business man is ready to swear that these communists are the finest fellows in the world, Mr. Martens mentions casually one little fact. The goods are to be exported by the manufacturer, and for that purpose an export license will be needed.

Nothing simpler, avers the happy business man, who hops on a train and goes to Washington to fix it. There he runs up against a snag. No export licenses are being granted for products destined to Russia. The business man sees his profits going glimmering. He gets boiling mad; he joins the agitation for lifting the blockade; he brings pressure to bear on his congressman, all exactly as Mr. Martens foresaw, and wished.

No one can criticise the Soviet ambassador for indulging in this strategy. It is entirely legitimate, and it has brought to his aid in an amazingly short time an extremely powerful group. Nevertheless, there is an element of disingenuousness in Mr. Martens's campaign. It implies that when the embargoes are all removed, these initial purchases will be followed by many others. It is altogether unlikely that this will be the case.

The presumption that America can export heavily to Russia is usually based upon one of two considerations: the existence of great stores of goods in Russia to be bartered for American manufactured products, or the use of a great quantity of gold which the Soviet government "took over" from the old regime. It is true that Russia in the past has had enormous surpluses of raw materials for export; but only a small fraction of such material is now at the seaboard, and the state of transport within the country is such that under the most favorable circumstances it would be many months, perhaps years, before any considerable quantity of

such goods could be made available. Vast amounts of wheat and hides have rotted in storage; and the inflation of the currency has reached a point where the peasant is reluctant to part with his produce for money regardless of price. He could be persuaded to barter, perhaps; but such an operation requires such tremendous initial expenditures and so much risk that American capital could only be secured with the greatest difficulty for the purpose.

Early in 1918, Lenin drew up for Colonel Raymond Robins a tentative scheme for economic relations between the United States and Russia, in which he outlined the possibilities of trade. At that time, Lenin said, Russia had the following for export: lumber to the value of 800,000 rubles (at the ruble valuation then current); flax and hemp, 220,000 rubles; oil, 250,000 rubles; manganese ore, 400,000 rubles; platinum, 200,000 rubles; bristles, horse hair and hoofs, 25,000 rubles; hides, 400,000 rubles; furs, 200,000 rubles; tobacco, 200,000 rubles; miscellaneous products, 150,000 rubles—a total slightly less than 3,000,000 rubles. Contrasted with the staggering figures of our imports from other nations, this amount is, of course, negligible.

It is moreover fair to assume that with the relaxation of the embargo, and the increasing rehabilitation of western Europe's economic life Russia's foreign trade will follow the normal channels which existed prior to 1914,—channels which, with some allowance for artificial tariff barriers, represented the line of least resistance. At that time the United States did only an insignificant fraction of Russia's foreign trade—averaging about one per cent. The figures supplied by Lenin—who certainly had no occasion to understate his case—are as follows:

PROPORTION OF RUSSIAN EXPORTS
GOING TO AMERICA

1912.....	1.2
1913.....	0.9
1914.....	0.9
1915.....	0.9
1916.....	2.2

Russia's imports from the United States formed a larger proportion of her total. The figures are:

PROPORTION OF RUSSIAN IMPORTS
COMING FROM AMERICA

1912.....	7.5
1913.....	5.8
1914.....	7.3
1915.....	26.8
1916.....	33.2

The two last years, of course, saw vast imports of war materials and are therefore not an accurate guide to normal conditions.

What sort of goods did the United States export to Russia? Here is the tabulation for 1916:

Dressed skins, 15,000,000 rubles; shoes, 28,000,000 rubles; machinery (except agricultural) 92,000,000 rubles; agricultural machinery 5,000,000 rubles; cotton, approximately 30,000,000 rubles.

What Russia wanted from the United States in 1918, according to Lenin, was railroad supplies, agricultural machinery, hydro-electric power plants, electric railroad equipment, mining equipment, cotton, cotton machinery, and some foodstuffs. As security for these purchases, the Bolshevik premier offered American capitalists concessions "to build electric power stations on the Volkhov and Sir and a canal from Soretskoe to Petrograd, to develop water routes in the Donetz basin, to develop coal mines, to exploit the seal industry in the Komondov islands and the lumber industry in southern Kamchatka, to build a railroad from Irkutsk to Bodai-bo," etc., etc.

However, speculations on this alluring prospect are idle. Russia's trade before the war belonged to Germany; and despite all the bright dreams of American friends of the Bolsheviks, to Germany it will go again when Europe has recovered from her sickness. The German is nearest, and the German understands Russia—or if he does not, he will take the trouble to find out.

Some years ago an American travelling in Germany met a manufacturer of some importance and was entertained at his home. The merchant had two adolescent sons who were to enter the export trade when they grew up. One, the American discovered, had been assigned to South America, and was hard at work learning Portuguese and Spanish. His room was lined with maps of Latin-American countries, his bookshelves contained books of travel and history in that field. The other was just as absorbed in Russia, already spoke the language with some fluency, and sought every opportunity to meet Russians who passed through the town. Careless easy-going America cannot meet competition such as this.

If no other factor were present, the exchange situation would serve to drive Russian trade into western European hands. However large the Soviet stock of gold, it will quickly melt away if used to purchase abroad. International trade cannot be conducted successfully over a long period unless it is genuine barter—unless exports and imports are roughly balanced.

As soon as Russian paper money is used, the rate of exchange becomes a factor. Expressed in terms of the dollar, the currency of each nation across Europe is depreciated in a declining scale. That

means that from iron-bound economic necessity each nation must buy as far to the east as possible—where its money has most value—and sell as far to the west as possible—where its payment is in terms of a currency at “super-normal” valuation. In particular, England and Germany are in a position to buy raw materials in the east at very low prices, manufacture at home, and sell the finished products in America, being paid in dollars which, translated into pounds or marks, mean very high prices.

However, there is one approach to American trade with Russia which is very seldom considered: Siberia. The resources of Siberia, which have hardly even been explored as yet, would furnish raw materials for export in the utmost abundance—minerals, timber, cereal grains, furs and hides, which could be put into American bottoms at Vladivostok for shipment to Seattle, San Francisco, or through the Panama Canal. The Soviet government would welcome such a commercial relationship; it has explicitly said so. The obstacle in the way, to speak frankly, is Japan.

There is no use blinking the fact that there is a growing belief that the plans of her military hierarchy contemplate no economic opportunities for other nations on the continent of Asia. The capture of Vladivostok a few weeks ago has undoubtedly heightened this impression. Discuss Japan with the next ten people you meet, and see whether seven of the ten do not manage to dig up the phrase, “The Germany of the Far East.”

If Japan's imperialistic schemes involved hostility to the Soviet government, the average American, Bolshevik-hating, would probably regard them with complacency; but there is no assurance that they mean anything of the kind. Japan's internal disorders have been, and are extremely serious; the revolutionary movement has been put down with a ferocity which implies that it has considerable strength. She is anxious to prevent further encroachment of communist notions from Russia, and has learned the bitter truth that there can be no sanitary cordon against ideas.

Suppose, under these circumstances, that Japan were to offer to establish a *modus vivendi* with the Bolsheviks! Suppose she were to offer the Soviets complete and unhampered political control of Siberia and withdrawal of all her own troops, in exchange for complete economic rights in the country? Lenin would give much to settle his military problems, of which Japan threatens to be not the least; he might well reason that the bargain was worth cementing—for a time anyhow—since it would give him a breathing space in which to attack the economic chaos of European Russia.

Such an arrangement would mean the end of any commercial aspirations of the United States in Siberia; it would greatly strengthen Japan; it would also, ironical as it may seem, greatly strengthen the Soviet government.

To be sure, Japan and the Bolsheviks are still, apparently, hostile. Seven hundred Japanese, of whom three hundred were civilians, were killed at Nikolaevsk on March 12th, and this has given Japan the excuse to break her solemnly pledged faith and to announce (May 11th) that in spite of her promise to withdraw all troops when the Czecho-Slovaks were all evacuated they will remain on the continent indefinitely. A buffer state of the three far-eastern provinces is now to be tried; but it is obviously a dubious experiment. Dr. T. Iyenaga, writing in the *New York Times* on June 6th, says: “The time has come when she (Japan) must take a definite stand toward Bolshevism. Shall she ally herself with it, or refuse to deal with it, or set it at open enmity?” The hint conveyed here has, in my opinion, already been considered by our State Department, and may have had some influence in determining our future relations with the Soviets. The relations between Japan and America are exceptionally cordial; everyone should hope, certainly, that they will remain so; but America would be sorry to see a working agreement between the Soviet government and Japan which might easily, as Russia is restored to vigor again, become the most powerful grouping of nations on earth. If the fear of such an eventuality can be made to serve the purpose of bringing the Allies to their senses about European Russia and the blockade, it will not have been in vain.

BRUCE BLIVEN.

Next to Advertising Matter

THE other day I had a letter from my old friend, Wellington Pierce, announcing that his new serial had been accepted by *McFord's Magazine* upon the most advantageous terms he had ever made, \$150,000 for six installments.

“What do you think!” he wrote. “They like *The End of the Arc* so much that they've promised to use the first chapter in the *Rolls Royce* section. It's the best yet—I've always been with the *Templars* and *Saxons*. Now I can boost my price again.”

It was great luck and Wellington deserved it. No one in my acquaintance has made such a study of magazine needs and policies. He knows the classification and copy of every type of advertisement and that he could land a serial in the high priced automobile section of the most popular

monthly, with the biggest circulation in 1930, is a result, not only of genius but serious study. Esther Roberts, one of the most promising members of our old writing club petered out simply because of her lack of adaptability. Her best short story was not aimed for any particular advertising section and she was lost among the linoleums and varnishes. My own novelette would have been a greater success if I had followed Wellington's method. My story was so general in its allusions that it was fitted in according to space with the hosiery and ready-to-wear waists. The drawings for this section were so spirited that the subtlety of my work was lost.

Wellington is easily the leader of the new school of magazine writers. Years ago he saw the trend in the magazine world and instead of becoming peevish and mooning about art and literature, he set about to develop something new in fiction. His first great success was about ten years ago, in 1920, when Everett's Weekly published his *Prairie Lovers*.

Wellington planned this story to fill the first page of the reading section and run over into the advertising. He counted his words so carefully and planned the run-over so well that in the great elopement scene, when Reginald, the hero said that the car was ready, you turned to page 152 and there was a full page picture of a Packard with the caption, "Always Ready for Any Emergency" and Alice and Reginald were in the act of stepping inside. The elopers made a good start and were well up the hill, just outside the town, when there was the terrific sound of a blow-out.

"This could never have occurred," said Reginald, "if I had put on a Fisher-Weston tire instead of thinking I could save money by using a Jackson-Jones which has no wearing quality."

Wellington arranged the dialogue in such a way that it led directly to an illustration, showing Reginald and Alice, looking at the flat tire in dismay. The caption announced, "This Could Never Have Occurred If He Had Used a Fisher-Weston Tire."

Wellington, however, was too good a magazine man to suggest an unhappy ending. Reginald *patched the tire with Beemoth's Tire Tape*. At this point the story was promoted to a center column with strings of *Beemoth's Tire Tape* dangling on one side and various automobile accessories pictured on the other.

The *Prairie Lovers* finally reached the prairie and then came the climax which showed Wellington's skill at its height. From the back of the car, Reginald drew out their future home, as easily as a magician draws rabbits from a silk hat. A few loose boards, and behold! Skinner's Portable

Bungalow, ready for occupancy without the use of hammer or nails. The story might have ended there with the usual "and they lived happily for ever after," but Wellington is a realist, and he went on to show the first meal in the little home, bringing in all the brands of canned goods, the fifty-seven varieties and the instantaneous pan-cakes.

The *Prairie Lovers* created a sensation in the advertising world and Wellington was offered huge sums to write around various commodities. His letter to me, with the news that he had at last broken into *McFord's Magazine* shows how well he used his opportunity. He was not only one of the well paid writers of the time but he had a position of distinction in the make-up.

His news started me on a train of reminiscences and made me realize what changes ten years had brought in the magazine world. In my day, as associate editor of *Every Woman's Way* we were in a transitional period. There was a hang-over of the tradition that magazines must have some literary quality. We felt obliged to carry a few regulation stories, with no connection whatever with the advertising and some poems and special articles. In those days, authors had no idea of the value of advertising space and wanted whole pages for their work. We were continually in trouble trying to place them where they thought they would be read. Sometimes a fine insurance story or an electrical adventure had to be relegated to the back of the book and an ordinary "he and she" romance used in the front pages.

I picked up a copy of *McFord's Magazine* for January, 1930. It certainly is an improvement. It makes the old type of magazine look as queer as the one large wheel bicycle or the early horseless carriage. In the first place, the girl is off the cover. What a time we used to have to find a pretty girl in a new pose, every month. We had exhausted the flower-smelling, powder-puffing, the valentine and the Christmas girl and were always in quest of a new face and a new attitude. Now, when a business firm buys the cover outright and its own artist makes the drawing to order, all that trouble is saved. *McFord's* pictured one of the new, inexpensive air-planes, swooping down toward an alighting station on Fifth Avenue. The page was bordered with little air-planes, doing somersaults, diving, flying upward and generally showing off. The whole effect was one of motion, life, speed. It was the apotheosis of vitality.

In the body of the magazine, *McFord's* represents the new arrangement adopted by all but a few extremely conservative periodicals. The poems are placed inconspicuously just inside the cover, where schools and book advertising used to be.

Hardly anyone except the authors and their relatives read magazine verse and by getting it out of the way in the first pages, the reader quickly finds the smaller advertisements. Having the stories on the outside columns and the advertisements in the center column, is another improvement on the old style. When the story was in the center of the page it sometimes diverted the reader from the small drawings of brushes and combs, table silver and jewelry. Now the eye falls naturally upon them and the content of the story on either side is arranged to lead to them.

McFord's Magazine uses stories as such only in the first few pages, which correspond to the former advertising section. The body of the magazine is made up entirely of advertising, a good deal of it in article and fiction form, some of it simply full page illustrations. McFord's pictures are always in colors and for sheer beauty they surpass anything we fondly used to call art. There are pages and pages of drawings; hunting scenes to show revolvers and rifles; landscapes with flowing rivers to show canoes and motor boats; mountain pictures for camping outfits, mansions and homes of every description, with cities beautiful as background. In the line of interior decoration, I have never seen anything more gorgeous than the full pages of oriental and American rugs and draperies. Household scenes, showing families actually using davenport and arm-chairs, playing pianolas and reading books gave a note of human interest, always desired by editors.

This new practice of having only advertising illustrations must save endless pain in editorial offices. I could not help smiling as I recalled various harrowing episodes in *Every Woman's Way*. I shall never forget Marie Burke's rage when Herbert Wesley drew her heroine in a Poiret frock with high winged slippers, the latest French fad and the Arc de Triomphe in the background. Marie had specifically stated that Alda, the heroine was athletic, that she wore sport skirts, sweaters and white sneakers. The story was set in an Adirondack camp, but Herbert visualized it in Paris. Eliminating fiction illustrations is surely the happiest way of bridging that natural chasm between authors and illustrators.

To me, however, the most fascinating part of McFord's Magazine, is the personality and success division. Beauty lotions, toilet powder, hair restorers and freckle removers have, of course, been developed to the utmost. The girl who used to be on the cover reigns supreme here, more gorgeous than ever, with pinkest cheeks, cherriest lips, blondest hair and most violet of eyes. But most of this appeals to younger or undeveloped readers.

The gist of the magazine, the highest place it has attained in world literature is in the advertising division on character building and money making.

Ten years ago, this appeal to the finer traits of human beings, their ambitions and their desire for self-perfection, was just coming into vogue. Character development storiottes were in the pioneer period, simple, primer-like anecdotes. I remember one we used in *Every Woman's Way* called "Can You Remember?" It was the story of an evening party, amusing itself with memory stunts. Finally one of the guests performs a marvellous memory feat, so remarkable that the group is impressed beyond measure. At last he confesses that he has taken Smyth's Memory Cure and Mind Aid by Association. The January McFord's carries this advertisement, but the new version is like a Conan Doyle or E. Phillips Oppenheim story, with murder, mystery, and a hair-raising climax. No one could read it without enrolling for the cure at once.

Speaking of cures, McFord's Health Section for January is worth preserving for reference. The old stuff, tell-me-what-you-eat-and-I'll-tell-you-who-you are and all the cruder physical education dope has been replaced by articles signed by well-known doctors and physical educators. In the old days, articles of this sort told you to eat well, sleep well and exercise, but it was all very general and gave no specific remedies unless you sent a stamped envelope for a personal reply. In the new magazine form, exercises are pictured in such an enticing way that only a lazy reader can refrain from waving arms and legs in rhythmic pursuit of health. Foods are shown in pages of illustrated layer cakes, biscuits and salads warranted to awaken the appetite of the most capricious. But the medicines and cures are what seemed to me so practical. All sorts of symptoms are described and the remedies given in such a way that an intelligent person can easily make a diagnosis and send for the remedy without going to doctor's office or drug store.

Decorative inspirational pages, once in fashion, have gone out completely and sermonettes and uplift articles have been replaced by "Personality's Magic Power," "How to be Brilliant," "Does Everyone Love You?" But these articles, which frequently advertise some metaphysical or psychological teacher are not in the simple form of 1920. All the details for practical application are suggested so that the most cynical and discouraged may find courage and optimism.

For love interest, without which no magazine is ever complete, romantic tales have been succeeded by practical talks and advice on the love life. The McFord's I glanced through after reading Wellington's letter had a remarkable section, "You

Are Attracted By Your Opposite in Color," with full instructions for blondes and brunets in the art of mating. This correspondence course, in its infancy of 1920, has revolutionized marriage and made divorce almost extinct. Once you place yourself in the color scale, harmony in marriage is assured. The fatal thing, and McFord's will not be responsible for the consequences of violation of this principle, is for blonde to wed with blond.

In connection with books advertised in the love section, the illustrators are at their best. Following Wellington Pierce's example in adapting fiction to the advertising, remarkable types have been evolved in the drawings. The blonde in "You Are Attracted By Your Opposite in Color" is pictured

in such a way that she fits in with a side section on women's apparel from shoes to hat. The art consists in achieving this without making her look like a fashion plate. The brunet, and all males are brunet if they would succeed in attracting women, who are always blondes, shows what men must wear in 1930.

In 1920 authors and advertisers were in hot competition for possession of the magazine world. By the law of natural selection and survival of the fittest, 1930 finds writers extinct and advertisers, supreme. Nothing in McFord's Magazine is without definite purpose for advertisers. It is a perfect illustration of evolution.

FLORENCE GUY WOOLSTON.

Arbitrating for Armenia

EVENTS have moved with great rapidity for the young Republic of Armenia in the past month. Today the whole future of the Armenian people seems to hang in the balance. Not because there is any probability of the Congress changing its mind about granting the President's request to empower him to accept a mandate for Armenia; there is none, and the more far-sighted Armenians recognize this and are already seeking other forms of American aid to assist their country to its feet. The future of Armenia is bound up with a seemingly minor thing: the President's acceptance of the task of arbitrating the boundaries between Armenia and Turkey.

To go back a bit, on April 23rd, Secretary of State Colby wrote Dr. Garo Pasdermajian, the Armenian representative in Washington, "that by direction of the President the Government of the United States recognizes as of this date the de facto Government of the Armenian Republic." But as if fate were thumbing her nose at this action, on April 27th, a Bolshevik uprising among the Russian workmen of the Baku oil wells resulted in an overthrow of the Mohammedan oligarchy of oil land owners in Azerbaidjan, and panic seized upon the whole of Transcaucasia lest Bolshevism engulf the former Viceroyalty entire. On May 5th, Colonel Haskell, the Allied High Commissioner to Armenia, ordered all of the American women workers of the Near East Relief to leave Transcaucasia, and himself led the thirty United States army officers under his command in an exodus from possible contact with the Reds.

Confronted by this alarming situation, the Senate, on May 13th, adopted a resolution re-

questing the President "to cause a United States warship and force of marines to be dispatched to such port [Batoum], with instructions to such marines to disembark and to protect American lives and property." On May 18th, Admiral Mark L. Bristol forwarded a message from Colonel Haskell, then at Batoum, painting the Armenian picture all in black: the Republic of Georgia was fighting the Bolshevik Azerbaidjanians on the frontier between the two countries, and the railway bridge over the Kura river at the frontier had been destroyed, with the result that no more fuel oil from the Baku wells was available to keep the Armenian railroads running. No train, Colonel Haskell said, had moved for ten days, and the only wagon road connecting Armenia with the outside world passed through the front line of the fighting armies. In Armenia, according to this report, Bolsheviks had seized the great railway center at Alexandropol and an armored train in Bolshevik hands controlled the situation. The Armenian garrison of Alexandropol had turned Bolshevik, seized the warehouses containing the allotment made by the Congress of the United States of flour for distribution to the destitute Armenians, placed their own guards over this and other American property, and kept Colonel Haskell's representative "practically a prisoner operating at Bolshevik dictation." The High Commissioner reported that he was selling the relief stores as best he could, to prevent their expropriation by communists.

Nothing of this startling picture of events in the Armenian republic was confirmed by the Armenian Legation in Washington, however. Rumors that the cabinet of Premier Khatissian had given way

to a Soviet government in Armenia proved unfounded; Khatissian merely resigned in favor of Dr. Chandjanian, a member of his own cabinet who had recently returned from Paris. Four days later Colonel Haskell himself amended his previous report with one less gloomy. The brief Red revolt at Alexandropol had been put down, he said. The American flour warehouses had suffered no damage and the American relief organizations had sustained no losses, anywhere. Communications with Armenia were magically opened once more. Peace reigned.

But it was peace without victory. The Republic of Armenia has, as yet, no outlet on the sea, and the very relief supplies sent by the United States depend for their delivery on the war-battered, much-abused Transcaucasian railway whose rolling stock has had no repairs in five years and whose sole fuel is the mazoot (oil residue) from the oil wells of Baku. With these in the hands of the Soviet Republic of Azerbaidjan, Armenia must beg permission of the Bolsheviks to move even the American flour upon which half a million of the Armenian refugees crowded in the young republic depend for their lives from day to day. The Armenian government must, therefore, make terms with the Soviet power at Moscow, or starve.

Unhappily for the advocates of an American mandate for Armenia, these events and the conflicting and uncertain reports of them which reached the United States could scarcely have been more accurately timed to prove disastrous to the mandate scheme. Even had popular judgment in respect of the mandate wavered, the picture of Armenia a prey to Bolshevik uprisings, sooner or later either in direct conflict with or in complete subjection to the Soviet power, was not calculated to attract governmental intervention in Armenian affairs. We are afraid of just one thing in this country, but we are grotesquely, unreasoningly afraid of that. It is Bolshevism. We have a feeling that Europe is somehow trying to trap us into fighting Bolshevism for the benefit of the rest of mankind. In the Armenian business, we seemed to see the springs of the trap. We would, therefore, have none of it.

To justify our indifference to the fate of Armenia, upon whose salvation over fifty million dollars, in private subscriptions, through the Near East Relief, have been spent in the past eight months, General Harbord's report, that a minimum of gross expenditure of \$151,202,800.00 per year for five years would be required to maintain tranquillity and restore order in Armenia, has been quoted by half the editorial writers in the United States to combat our acceptance of a mandate. But they forget to note that the territory over which

General Harbord was considering the possibility of an American mandate was approximately 302,000 square miles in extent, with a population of some seventeen and a half million souls, and included Constantinople, Thrace, the whole of Asia Minor and Anatolia, besides Kurdistan and Russian and Turkish Armenia. The four Turkish vilayets within whose extent President Wilson was graciously permitted by the San Remo Conference, on April 26th, to fix the boundaries of Armenia, only include, together with the whole of Russian Armenia, 67,400 square miles of territory, with a total population of but some 5,000,000 in all. Nor is there any reason to believe that the Armenia the President may delimit will include all of this territory comprised by the vilayets of Erzeroum, Trebizond, Van and Bitlis. In a word, the only Armenia now under consideration by anyone is at most but 22 per cent of the territory General Harbord had in contemplation as the land and the people to come under "what any American would consider the proper administration of the country."

Two of the seven vilayets claimed by Armenia have already gone to France, parts of two others to England, while the remainder of the Armenian territory is reassigned to the Ottoman Empire by the treaty now waiting Turkey's acceptance. In the circumscribed, scantily populated, undeveloped and impoverished Armenia whose boundaries with Turkey President Wilson is to fix, a mere handful of real soldiers, properly equipped and adequately armed, could keep the peace. A year ago, it was generally conceded in diplomatic circles in Washington that "a few regiments of American troops would be all that would be necessary." With the organization of a native constabulary by American army officers, who have already performed similar work in the Philippines, even this force of between five and six thousand American soldiers could soon be dispensed with.

It is significant in this connection that the Supreme Council at Paris decided on March 23rd, "to offer the protection of the League of Nations to an independent Armenia," whatever that might mean, and at about the same time a distinguished American army officer who had had long experience with the organization of the Philippine constabulary and who was personally acquainted with the problem presented by internal conditions in Armenia, was approached by the League of Nations to accept the organization of a local constabulary in Armenia as the means of maintaining order in the country, under a League of Nations mandate. He was to be furnished equipment for a force of 40,000 men. The American officer in question requested some guarantee that the Armenia in which he was expected to organize a protective force

would be of sufficient extent to satisfy the Armenian people and so unite them that their unanimous cooperation might be counted upon. The League of Nations was unable or unwilling to give this assurance. The American officer therefore refused to consider the proposal, regarding it as a mere sop to public opinion in the world at large, which would furnish no permanent or satisfactory solution of the Armenian question.

General Harbord's report contemplated no such half way measures as that with which the League of Nations as mandatory for Armenia would seem to have been satisfied. "What any American would consider the proper administration of the country" was, to him, a very concrete thing—the best conceivable administration; and his estimates of the force required and the cost it would entail are based upon that conception. He was undoubtedly correct in assuming that, as a nation, the United States could do the job in no lesser way. But it is nevertheless certain that what will come to pass in Armenia as a result of the refusal of the United States to take a thankless and costly mandate will be something very inferior, indeed, to the result which General Harbord had in mind as possible.

The first indication of this is to be found in that portion of the Turkish treaty by which the Ottoman Empire is bound "to accept arbitration by the President of the United States with regard to the frontier between Turkey and Armenia in the provinces of Erzeroum, Trebizond, Van and Bitlis, and to grant the access of Armenia to the sea," and the fact that the President has accepted "with satisfaction this occasion for rendering service to the people of Armenia." It is difficult, indeed, to see how the President will be rendering any service whatever to the people of Armenia by agreeing to place the frontiers of Armenia with Turkey *within* the limits prescribed by the four vilayets mentioned. Precisely the same type of diplomatic duplicity which has characterized the attitude of the British and French governments towards Armenia from time immemorial is here exemplified. By leaving the decision to President Wilson, whose known sympathies with Armenia would seem to guarantee a decision eminently favorable to the Armenians, the British and French have the air of having done a very fine thing; but by limiting, explicitly, the territory *within which alone* the President's arbitration is free to function, they have seen to it that any Armenia the President may delimit shall be reduced to a barren plateau surrounded by hostile Mussulmans, with a minimum prospect of economic independence in the future.

Trebizond is not even one of the six Armenian vilayets enumerated by Article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin, or of the seven vilayets (the seventh

being Cilicia) recognized by the Ambassadors' Memorandum of 1895. In it, even according to Armenian figures, the Greeks have an 11 per cent plurality over the Armenian population of before the massacres. It seems to have been included in the present proposal with the idea that President Wilson would grant Armenia the promised outlet to the sea by that route, and thus save Batoum to England. If so, the design to wall Armenia in is even subtler than it at first seemed, since the gradient of the Trebizond railway is such that any profitable export of the normal products of Armenia through Trebizond by rail is permanently out of the question.

The President's proposal to give Armenia an outlet through Batoum is quite in line with the precedent set by the effort to adjudicate Danzig to Poland. Even the Armenians claim but 15,182 Armenians in Batoum province, out of an indigenous population of 95,292 (1917) mostly Moham-medan Lazes (Adjars), Georgians forcibly converted to Islam after the Treaty of Belgrade in 1739. The Black Sea outlet of the oil pipe line from Baku, Batoum has been held by the British since December, 1918, and on February 21st, the British announced their intention of remaining in Batoum at least six months longer. This decision aroused the greatest resentment in Georgia, and motivated an immense anti-British demonstration throughout the Georgian Republic on "Batoum Day," March 19th. On May 10th, Colonel Haskell reported that the bitterness of the Georgians over British retention of their only port had culminated in open hostilities, that the British were holding only a fringe around the town, and had begun the evacuation of the port. Under these circumstances, while it may be simple from a distance of 6,000 miles for President Wilson to hand the Georgians of Batoum "from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were property," they may have something to say about the matter themselves. Doubtless the final result will be the one which might have been foreseen from the beginning: the British will continue to hold Batoum and the Black Sea outlet of the oil pipe line, in one capacity or another, and an arrangement will be reached similar to that fixing the status of Danzig, by which the Armenians will be permitted to use Batoum as a port. As Batoum was a free port once before in its history, so established by Article 59 of the Treaty of Berlin, perhaps no miracles may be anticipated from this arrangement. But it will be interesting to see whether the solution reached by the "liberals and friends of humanity" is not identical with that laid down by Bismarck in 1878.

The other significant feature of the President's service to the people of Armenia in delimiting the

boundaries of their country, is the reservation by which the boundaries with the Republic of Georgia and the Soviet Republic of Azerbaidjan "are to be settled by direct agreement." Ever since Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaidjan broke up housekeeping on May 26th, 1918, by declaring their respective independence of the Transcaucasian Federation, they have waited on the Peace Conference to adjudicate certain mooted territory between them. There have been half a dozen incipient wars over these contested districts, and in all of these disputes Armenia is vitally involved. The Khatissian cabinet has given an example of touching faith in the Peace Conference by staking everything on its decisions, while the Azerbaidjanians on the other hand have pursued a policy of aggression, seizing wherever they could the territory in dispute with Armenia and holding it on the theory that possession outweighed subservience to Peace Conference dictates. As a result of this practical policy, they now hold the rich mineral district of Zanguezur and the Karabakh, as well as the valley of the Araxes river, from Mt. Ararat to the Caspian. The latter includes 387,500 acres of irrigated land suitable for cotton growing, which formed in Persian days the khanate of Nakhitchevan. It may be recalled that, a year ago, one Djaffar Khoolis, Khan of Nakhitchevan, aroused no little merriment in this country by requesting the United States to accept a mandate for the area in question.

Those two districts, the Karabakh mountains with their copper, silver, lead, sulphur and iron mines, and the immense stretch of irrigated potential cotton land of Nakhitchevan, have been the battleground of an almost continual conflict between Azerbaidjan and Armenia since the breakup of the Russian Caucasus army in 1917. Colonel James C. Rhea, the Acting Allied High Commissioner, finally effected an agreement between the two countries on November 23rd, 1919, by which peace was established and the sovereignty of the disputed territory left to the decision of the Peace Conference. So long as Colonel Rhea remained in Transcaucasia, this arrangement was effective, as by agreement he was made personal arbiter of all disputes; but on his withdrawal, hostilities were renewed. With recent purchases by the Soviet Republic of Azerbaidjan of large quantities of arms and ammunition from the disintegrated Denikin army, the Azerbaidjanians have lately inaugurated a serious campaign of conquest against the Armenian Republic in the disputed territory.

With Georgia on the other hand, Armenia has two equally important districts in litigation: the Borchalo district, only twenty-six miles south of Tiflis, and the Ardahan-Olti region, sixty-seven miles southwest of Batoum. The former is in-

habitated neither by Armenians nor by Georgians, but by Russian "Molokons," of the peculiar religious sect which Catherine II tried to break up by colonizing some of them in Transcaucasia. The real bone of contention in this zone is the Alaverdi copper mines, now operated by French capital, and a very valuable property. On December 22nd, 1918, a war broke out between Georgia and Armenia for possession of this district, which was halted on January 2nd, 1919, by the intervention of the British. Peace was signed on January 17th, 1919, leaving decision as to the sovereignty of the Borchalo area to the Peace Conference in Paris, and placing the disputed territory under a neutral governor. It is at present administered by Major Charles E. Livingston, A. S., U. S. Army.

The Ardahan-Olti region is likewise in dispute because of its mineral resources—the coal mines of Olti. There have been sharp conflicts between the Georgians and the Armenians over the area which have never, however, reached the stage of war. Colonel James C. Rhea effected an agreement between the two governments whereby a joint occupation of Ardahan left both sides satisfied, while the Kurds took over Olti, thus placing it temporarily out of litigation. The ownership of this district, also, was to have been settled by the Peace Conference.

These conflicts may seem minor ones. So, perhaps, were those over Teschen or the Saar valley, and these like those more familiar to us are fraught with the possibility of future war. It is not to be forgotten that the late war began between Austria and Serbia; it is not inconceivable that a vast Christian-Mohammedan conflagration may one day be set alight over the ownership of the valley of the Araxes.

Certainly these disputes are full of menace for the future security and tranquillity of Armenia, and in them the President's arbitration of the Armenian frontiers with Turkey plays no healing part. The purpose of leaving these mooted questions to "direct agreement" is evident to anyone familiar with the local situation. All the territory involved in dispute is of great value on account either of its mineral resources or its agricultural possibilities. There have been in Transcaucasia for over a year British, French and Italian Missions deeply interested in securing concessions of one sort or another. One British officer, General Newcomb, frankly admits that he is the representative of large English financial interests. The British High Commissioner, Mr. Oliver Wardrop, is a known pro-Georgian, keenly sympathetic also with the Mohammedans of Azerbaidjan and in consequence scarcely favorable to Armenia. Major de Nonancourt, of the French Mission, one of those royalists

peculiar to the French professional army, makes no concealment either of his attachment to the Georgians or his hostility towards the Menshevist government of Armenia.

From the friendly mediation of such influences as these the young Armenian state has little to hope in conducting "direct" negotiations. Every trick of the most approved European diplomatic intrigue will be turned to see that the valuable lands Armenia claims go either to weaker Georgia or to less enterprising and less intelligent Azerbaidjan. The President has been assigned Armenia's boundaries with Turkey to fix—after first carefully limiting the sphere of his action to prevent his granting anything of real value to Armenia. Under cover of this bit of ostensible disinterestedness towards the Armenian Republic, the agents of England, France and Italy in Transcaucasia will look after the delimiting of the far more important frontiers of Armenia on the north and northeast.

The world is to be filled with stories of Bolshevism in Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaidjan. The menace of a great Soviet Empire stretching through Persia to Egypt—or even to Charing Cross, if need be—is to be played up in the press until any solution of the Transcaucasian problem which seems to frustrate a world conquest by the Bolsheviks will prove acceptable to the American public. There will even be much talk of a combination of Soviet and Mohammedan forces, to frighten the religious element in the United States by the threat of an anti-Christian domination of the world.

And under cover of all this smoke screen of arrant nonsense, what will happen to Armenia?

PAXTON HIBBEN.

The Ten Commandments, Again

THE lawyer approached through the haze of the crowded suburban smoker and halting before me braced himself for the onslaught with flashing eye and squared chin. Swaying on a strap he began,—“Hello, Professor!” (My lawyer friend thus addresses me when in censorious or contemptuous mood: when more indulgent, it is “Author”—both professions being in his eyes equally futile.) “Reading that Bolshevik sheet!” He glanced scornfully at the copy of the N. R. in my hands. “It ought to be suppressed.”

“Why?” I demanded amicably.

“And you ought to be suppressed,” he continued, pulling himself up an inch or two on his strap, with head drawn back as if calculating where to hit next. “You and X. and Y.” He named two of my most eminent colleagues with whom I feel proud to share

even a curse. “You are a lot of damned Bolsheviks, teaching anarchy”

“As for myself,” I protested mildly, “I teach nothing more dangerous than contemporary literature, which, as you ought to know, is composed for the most part by members of the capitalist class for the consumption of young women of the same class. . . . If anything like revolt has crept into modern European literature, you can hardly hold me responsible.”

“Camouflage!” he fumed. (It is the one French word added to his vocabulary from war journalism, and it is often on his tongue.) “If I were a university trustee—”

“Yes, I know what you would do if you were a trustee. You would hold a drum-head court-martial on the campus, and every instructor who could not subscribe to your political and social opinions would be ‘shot at dawn’. . . . Well, we haven’t got to that yet, quite. . . . So tell me about your row with the corporation counsel—I see he is trying to keep your clients from their plunder.”

His wrath, being turned from myself and the N. R. to the authorities and powers that be, he cursed them beginning with the President and proceeding with the Senate and the House of Representatives, the Attorney-General, etc., etc., severally and collectively. Murmuring a meek amen to his litany I remarked at last,—“You don’t seem to like the duly constituted authorities any better than the Bolsheviks, as you call them. You ought to be a little more sympathetic with dissent.”

“I’m no radical!” he shouted. “I’m for law and order! And I’d like to get out after that scum,” he snarled with characteristic incoherence, as he reached with his free hand for his hip pocket in the atavistic gesture of the American caveman. “Shoot ‘em down like rats!” etc., etc. (More of the “blank wall,” “day break,” the “nearest lamp post,” etc.) While he itemized profanely all the dreadful things he would do to men with whose opinions he did not agree, I mused: why did this frail little lawyer so thirst after shooting at day break, blank walls, and red blood? I saw him running into the streets from his office or his apartment (perchance in his pajamas) with a big automatic in his unsteady hands, firing wildly anywhere at anybody in a blind rage, and thus relieving the pressure on his brain that years of sedentary application in an over-heated office to the law of property had created. He was swelling now with the bare imagination of it. How he would like to save the republic! . . . His rage was directed vaguely at something which he could not define and which embodied itself now here, now there, in this person or that—as it had seized upon me.

It was simply what our grandmothers called a

state of mind, a condition of fractious masculinity that the newspapers now describe as a brain storm. A nervous disease which attacks the human animal when he is subjected too often and too constantly to undue excitements. Such a brain storm is sweeping the better classes of the entire community, of the world! The little lawyer hanging to his strap in the suburban smoker and shaking his fist at me was suffering from a suppressed desire to kill: the Radical, the Red, the Bolshevik was some terrifying creation of his brain, personifying all his rage, his irritations, his fears because of the unsatisfactory state of things in which the world had been left after four years of blood-letting. . . .

Surely a sense of humor is the one specific indicated for the disease, and so while my lawyer friend was still mumbling on about what he would do at break of day with his gun I pulled him into the vacant seat beside me and observed soothingly,—

"Neither your feelings nor mine will settle this business. Don't excite yourself: it will all come out in the wash some day, no matter what you or I happen to think about the Reds."

But he would have none of my soothing syrup. Across his tense face there crept a curious expression of baffled rage, as if I were trying deliberately to deprive him of a legitimate passion.

"You think so? Well, let me tell you that what I think and feel will mean something, is going to count!" He clenched again his withered little fist and shook it vaguely around him. "When it comes to a showdown, etc."

I gave him up, and he fumed until we descended from the train in the raw March twilight and trudged down the long street homewards. The attack seemed to be passing under the chill air, but I revived it by a foolish question,—

"What would you do to mend matters—besides shoot at daybreak?"

He squared himself beneath a lamp post and began shaking that puny fist again.

"What would I do? Let me tell you! I'd make the Ten Commandments law, by God! Yes, sir, the Ten Commandments, and make every foreign s. o. a. b. in this country obey them or go to jail. That's what I would do, by God!"

"Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain," I murmured, wondering if my friend was as familiar with the Ten Commandments as with corporation law. "There would be trouble with 'thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's ass, nor his man servant nor his maid servant,' not to mention the famous seventh, which from what I read seems to be more honored in the breach than by observance."

"That's all right . . . You mark my words: this country has got to go back to the Ten Commandments. And the sooner the better!"

He drew himself up to his full five feet six and looked me accusingly in the eye. As a parlor Bolshevik, of course, I should not be able to subscribe to the Ten Commandments. Then as he marched off up the street to his home, head erect, I could imagine him muttering to himself, "The Ten Commandments, by God—and give 'em the limit if they won't stand for 'em—or shoot at daybreak."

I wondered where the lawyer had picked up his panacea for revolution, Bolshevism, etc. He was not likely to have stumbled across the Ten Commandments accidentally. Did he really believe that the world brain-storm could be cured by merely enacting the ancient Hebrew precepts for tribal righteousness into statute law? (I seem to remember they tried it out in Kansas some years ago without noticeable results.) And did he not foresee how the Ten Commandments would interfere with the free prosecution of his own profession?

The lawyer's sudden enthusiasm for the Ten Commandments was explained when I read the announcement in a news dispatch from Washington of the formation of a new patriotic organization for "Americanization." These "United Americans," as they called themselves, had taken for platform the Flag and the Ten Commandments. The list of charter members was a blue ribbon assortment of leading and substantial citizen, "nationally known," (some of the names were familiar even to me). They were just the sort of prominent citizen,—bankers, financiers, and promoters,—that my lawyer friend would feel proud to associate himself with. He had doubtless enrolled as a "United American" and accepted wholeheartedly and fervently their quaint program for social stabilization,—the enactment of the Ten Commandments into American law. As usual law for the other fellow! For it is inconceivable that my bygawding friend and his associates,—the United Americans,—contemplate the restriction of their own privileges by any literal enforcement of such drastic precepts as the Ten Commandments. Whether modern society could be run on a strict application of the Ten Commandments will remain a debatable question, of not even academic interest to the average citizen. But, I suspect, the United Americans merely wish to try them on the dog,—the alien within our gates.

There is a briefer and more inclusive version of the Commandments to which I invite the attention of the United Americans,—

"Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy Heart . . . and the second is like unto it, *Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself*. On these two Commandments hang all the Law and the Prophets."

ROBERT HERRICK.

Our Undeclared War

Russian-American Relations, March, 1917, to March, 1920—Documents and Papers. Compiled and edited by C. K. Cumming and Walter W. Pettit, under the direction of John A. Ryan, D.D., J. Henry Scattergood, and William Allen White, at the request of The League of Free Nations Association. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Howe.

I. THE BOOK.

DIPLMACY is a matter of men, working behind an impenetrable screen of governmental reserve. In front of the screen governments set their scenes and stage their effects. Not till pitiless history exposes the machinery do facts come to light. Illusion and deception have been used with more sinister effect in Russian affairs than in any other; it is fortunate that at length a chronicle has been prepared, which—at least so far as Russian-American relations are concerned,—lets the truth appear. Passing for a moment the stress and speed of events, this book, *Russian-American Relations, March 1917—March 1920*, published by the League of Free Nations Association, is a singularly dramatic record. It has its ensembles of moving armies, its outstanding contrasts of character, its rising tide of climax, its denouements. Here is the querulous Francis, tenuously holding his ambassadorship. Here too is the full-blooded idealist, Raymond Robins, and beside him the cool, astute Lockhart with his calculating promotion of the British interest. The scenes shift slowly: Moscow, Vologda, Washington, Paris. Bullitt appears, does his work, vanishes. Sentimental appeal gleams occasionally through the mist—as when, at the close of a State Department dispatch appears the interlineation—"For Robins. . . . Thank god you are staying. Mizpah. Margaret." Even the title-page has its significance: Scattergood is known for his relief in many countries; Walter Pettit was one of Francis's assistants in Russia, and later accompanied Bullitt upon his famous mission. The collected telegrams of those days offer a liberal education in the way American foreign affairs are handled. Then let the workers tell their tale.

II. THE WAR AGAINST GERMANY.

Americans who read and think as they read, will find it hard to turn the pages without passion. It is an Eastern paraphrase of the tragedy of Versailles; American idealism, whose exponents were used as dupes and catspaws by our professed friends.

The revolution of March, 1917, was a revolution for peace; the Russians were done with all war. Allied diplomacy, and American diplomacy too, had at the time but one object—to induce Russia to fight the Germans. On our part there was some sympathy with the revolution as an idealistic matter: witness the two great welcomes to the new Republic, Wilson's famous message of congratulation to Kerensky,—government to government,—and the mass demonstration to Boris Bakhmetiev upon his visit to the House on Henry Street in New York,—peoples to peoples. Inducing Kerensky's government to fight Germany was an easy matter; it fought, though without enthusiasm. Inducing the Russian people to fight was the real task. When they did fight, it was with bad luck which disgusted our then associates in the war, who promptly plotted to overthrow Kerensky in favor of the Cossack general Kornilov. Fortunately we were not then so mired in Allied imperial-

ism that the stain of Kornilov's affair finds place in the chronicle.

November of 1917 and the Bolshevik coup d'état found a little group of Americans on the ground. David Francis was Ambassador, with the difficult job of representing the United States in a country which had a solid government to which the United States denied recognition. Raymond Robins, with a corps of able assistants, succeeded W. B. Thompson as head of the American Red Cross relief work; and had established such personal relations with the Soviet officials that he and not Francis was the real diplomatic medium; indeed, as the correspondence shows, the Moscow papers at one time asserted that Francis was to be relieved, giving place to Robins—an assertion which Robins hastened to repudiate. The Committee on Public Information was doing propaganda work for the American government in an endeavor to strengthen the failing Russian military morale. Russia in turn reacted on us; witness Wilson's fourteen points: bearing some resemblance to the fifteen points of the Petrograd Soviet unfortunately omitted from the compilation. This statement of principles of the Peace which the American people had sought in vain to procure, was vouchsafed as a counterproposition to the Soviet proposal to make peace on their own terms. "President's speech placarded on walls Petrograd this morning. . . . Izvestia official government newspaper nearly million circulation throughout Russia printed speech in full Saturday morning with comment welcoming it as sincere and hopeful" wired Sisson a day or two later. The simple-minded Russians took us at our word and offered to call a general conference based on those principles, asking all the Allies to participate. On refusal, with Allied prestige much the worse for wear, the Brest-Litovsk negotiations were begun.

Here the Germans gave us every help. In reasonable friendship the Allied embassies left Moscow for Vologda; the German representatives at Brest worked out the damnable forerunner of Versailles; and the Soviets before ratifying it cast about for aid. They went not to the embassies but to Robins. Would Great Britain, France and America support Russia—and what kind of support would it be? Military supplies? If Japan seized Vladivostok under some arrangement with Germany—or without any arrangement, what would the Allies do about it? Pertinent questions these. Apparently Robins consulted the British High Commissioner, Bruce Lockhart—who knew more than he could tell the Americans. "Empower me to inform Lenin that the question of Japanese intervention has been shelved" Lockhart wrote despairingly to Downing Street. . . . "I cannot help feeling that this is our last chance."

We had nothing to say; and the Brest peace was ratified. Robins made a last stand, took his diplomatic life in his hands, and telegraphed Trotsky that the threatened Japanese intervention was over their embassy's protest. Technically he was right; even Polk had advised the Japanese against it. Practically he was wrong; the same day Wilson telegraphed his greetings to the first All Russian Congress of Soviets, Balfour announced to Parliament that the British Government considered the Japanese "would enter Siberia as friends of Russia" (March 14, 1918) and three weeks later a joint landing of British and Japanese marines at Vladivostok commenced the first of the Allied interventions.

Something had happened: we know it, now, since Pichon's angry admission in the midst of the storm of the debates in the French Chamber in May 1919—the Allies had agreed to divide Russia into "Zones of action."—The

diplomatic battle was over. Instead of inducing Russia to fight Germany, the Allies had been induced to fight Russia.

III. THE WAR AGAINST SOVIET RUSSIA.

And now the armies were in the field. By April British troops under cover of their friendly landing at Murmansk to protect supplies, had penetrated the whole Murman peninsula, had negotiated arrangements with the local soviets cutting them off from the central government, and were laying their plans toward Archangel. The Japanese had cut north from Vladivostok along the Chinese eastern railway—this is Chinese territory to be sure, but what does that matter? Francis from Vologda despairingly tries to explain away their Siberian ravages; the Japanese, serene in forceful possession under the Allied accord, were content to bide in silence. The history of the Anglo-French support of Kolchak in the Urals, and of the French support of Denikin in the Don country need not be repeated; an Allied or subsidized army was astride of every principal Russian communication, cutting off the masses of population in Great-Russia from all their supplies of food and fuel. Our State Department was faced with a situation; wobbled;—then fairly embarked us in our most terrible mistake.

In July American troops were landed in Vladivostok—under Japanese command.

In August American troops were landed in Archangel—under British command.

The whole under some secret arrangement whose existence is admitted but whose terms have not been revealed even today. No chronicle includes the whole of the story. Some of the tale can now be told in connection with these records which Scattergood and Pettit and their associates have collected. It can be told, for instance, that after a revolution in Archangel under cover of which the invading French and American troops were enabled to assert that they received a welcome on Russian soil, the government appeared too democratic to satisfy the British commander General Poole; and he assisted a coup d'état aimed to set up the dictatorship of a Russian tsarist adventurer Chaplin. It fell of its own weight. It can be told that the British demanded and got complete control of the currency and banking of this incipient "Archangel Republic." It can be told that on the other side of the world the Japanese were expelling American soldiers and the American Railway Mission under Stevens, from the Chinese Eastern Railway—until so tense a situation developed that in the fall of 1918 we even considered cutting off exports to Japan of certain essential products. It can be told too that the Japanese, having agreed with our State Department, (which at last had awakened to the danger of a Japanese militarist policy submerging the Asiatic coast) that they would maintain only a limited expedition in Siberia, had promptly broken that agreement by landing nearly double the force; until relations became so strained that even the Imperial Japanese government feared to strain them further, and withdrew.

Of course there was a policy. It was based on a theory that all Russia seethed with anti-Soviet sentiment; that if nuclei were established, loyal Russians would gather and the mass so formed, increasing as it went onward, would descend like an avalanche upon Moscow. No need here to detail the sorry failure of Archangel, Siberia, or of Denikin on the Don. Of course there was an excuse. We

were still at war with Germany, and German troops might be diverted from the Western front. The Japanese—with our help as subordinates—did not waste much time at this. They were content to "protect Kolchak's rear"—and consolidate their conquest in the eastern Siberian provinces. There was also a reason. It lay in the spheres of influence allotted—of which more in a moment. The policy interested no one; upsetting other people's governments is bad business. The excuse and the reason were what counted.

Then suddenly the excuse failed. Armistice . . . The German war was over; fighting Russia must be explained on other grounds.

IV. THE PEACE.

Of the coming of the vision of Lloyd George no one can write until that statesman's memoirs are printed. Of its effect on Europe the writer can bear witness. For he sat one day in a quiet café by the Seine as the Peace Conference was congregating, when a certain journalist came in, full of excitement. A socialist sailor cleaning up in the Quai d'Orsay had chanced upon a copy of a French note (republished in this volume) to England—a note setting out that Lloyd George had proposed so radical a thing as making peace with Russia—and to that end calling all Russian factions, Bolsheviks included, to Paris; which suggestion Pichon on behalf of the Clemenceau government had indignantly repudiated—"La France ne pactisera pas avec la crime." The sailor was interested; he took the copy to the socialist editors, who fearing censorship had called in American journalists through whom the story could be transmitted to America. But Wilson was coming to Paris; time pressed. The editors decided to chance it,—and pandemonium reigned in Paris.

It was the first question before the Peace Conference; we have the record of the passionate sessions of the incoming statesmen. After a furious afternoon Lloyd George flung a caustic challenge: "It would be manifestly absurd for those who are responsible for bringing about the Peace Conference to come to any agreement and leave Paris when one-half of Europe and one-half of Asia is (sic) still in flames. Those present must settle this question—or make fools of themselves." Whereupon Wilson, whose lustre was still undimmed, proposed the meeting at Prinkipo. It never came to pass. Here the compilation of documents is at its weakest; no collection dealing purely with American relations can even suggest the intrigue which ensued. An instance may show. While the Prinkipo negotiations were fairly under way, a little group of Ukrainians came into the Crillon and put on the writer's desk copies of telegrams which had passed between the Ukrainian forces and the French high command. The Ukrainians were nationalist—they fought solely for independence. The French, in pursuance of the Allied accord which left them a free hand in the south of Russia, had landed troops at Odessa. They had agreed to submit Russia as well as other questions to the Peace Conference, and to the conference at Prinkipo. Nevertheless once safely away from Paris, their High Command under General Berthelot sent an emissary, one Captain Langeron, to negotiate for the establishment of a French protectorate over the Ukraine. One telegram is especially enlightening; it asked for the resignation of the principal members of the Ukrainian directory, and . . . "3. Control of the railway lines by the French high authorities . . . 5. French control of finances, for their 'purification' . . . 6. In case of the fall of Kiev, the

Ukrainian Government shall be immediately transferred to Odessa . . ." (i. e. to the headquarters of General Berthelot) . . . "7. The supreme command of the Ukrainian armies shall be held by the French . . . 12. According to the agreement consummated between the French Government and the Ukrainian Government the latter shall address itself to the French Government, admit its mistakes, promise to wage war against the Bolsheviks, and request her aid in reconstructing her army, and in reorganizing the economic, financial, military and political life of the Ukraine." Then a delicious touch: "The request of the Ukrainian Government to France shall be based on confidence in the French, on their magnanimity, and their historic glory." And it appears that the French declared they were authorized to speak in the name of all the Allies.

The intrigue failed, though backed by thirty thousand Franco-Greek troops in the Ukraine. A certain group of young men in the Crillon caused an inquiry to be made concerning this astonishing correspondence. After a few days the Paris newspapers recorded that Ukrainian negotiations after being conducted with distinguished success in the Ukraine would be transferred to Paris; and the Langeron incident was abruptly terminated. The Ukrainians refused to be absorbed; during the bickering, Soviet armies swept the Ukraine, which mutinied to receive them; within two months after the arrogant demand that the Ukraine surrender to France's "historic magnanimity and glory," the French High Command asked—and got—twelve hours' armistice by grace of the Odessa City Soviet to leave the town.

That was the French intrigue. The British one is better known, because they adopted the expedient of getting an American, Bullitt, to act as catspaw. You can read in his testimony the letter from Lloyd George's secretary stating what peace terms would be desirable to obtain from the Bolsheviks; this, with other instructions Bullitt took to Russia. He got the Soviet government's acceptance of those terms; came back; found himself repudiated because, as Lloyd George explained, Northcliffe and Randolph Churchill had rigged Commons against him and to stand by Bullitt would have meant a smash. It is to be noted that Lloyd George's government stoutly denied all of this until faced with the signed documents. All these things went on beneath the surface of the Paris negotiations; and with it continued the steady absorption by the Japanese of every desirable position in the Siberian coast provinces by our friends in the Far East.

Once more the armies take a determining part in the tale. The French disaster at Odessa cleared the South. The Peace Conference dickered with Kolchak, and, breaking all previous commitments, offered to support him; decided to; did; to find that the Soviet armies had crumbled his front in the Urals; and that tale ended a short time ago with a betrayal, a capture, and Kolchak's death at the hands of a Soviet firing squad; his whole attempt having been made possible by Europeans, and supported so far as they could arrange it, with American money and arms. British mutinies at Archangel, coupled with the hopelessness of a mad venture, led to our withdrawal after a furious winter's fighting in which no disgusting details of drunken officers, sacrificed Americans, and hopeless horror was wanting. We saw some of those men come back under draped colors the other day; the writer stood uncovered before the passing coffins, meditating on many things. In-

tervention had failed; intrigue had failed; the peace at Versailles with all its dramatic accompaniment was signed; but it left red war in two continents; and the conference closed echoing Lloyd George's flung challenge at its opening—half Europe and half Asia was still in flames; and the plenipotentiaries had made fools of themselves.

V. WHAT NEXT.

Now it is a condition and not a theory which confronts us. We are not at war with Russia, nor are we at peace. We do not blockade Russia, but we will not sell goods. We object to Japanese aggrandisement, but Japan occupies and apparently proposes to hold all of the Russian Pacific Coast, with the Chinese Eastern railway beside. We desire freedom of American markets, yet we cannot enter the Baltic Sea nor the Baltic states except by grace of the British fleet. It is true that save in Siberia, where the Japanese used us as catspaws to some advantage, we retrieved few chestnuts. We have nothing to show for our adventure save an unnecessary hate of us in the Russian people, and an unnecessary menace in the Pacific. We have nothing to look back on save a humiliating bit of history.

But we can do something about it; and this collection of documents points the way.

We can demand that this hole-and-corner fooling with our honor and our men shall cease.

We can demand that the whole truth be made known; that General Graves's dispatches from Siberia be made public, that Morris's investigation of Kolchak be printed, that the unbiased reports from Archangel be brought to light, that the whole correspondence between the State Department and its representatives to Japan be laid out, and all the Russian papers be put on the table.

And we can demand that the government face the question of our relations with Russia; determine an American policy—not some policy of European publications. It need not be a pro-Soviet policy; the Soviets have many sins on their souls. It ought to be a pro-Russian policy, aiming to relieve in some sense the misery which is there. Above all it ought to be an honest policy, frankly enunciated and loyally adhered to. If the question turns out to be Japanese, we should meet that, head-on, at Tokio. If it is a British question, we should meet that, head-on, at London. But faced now with its own record, the government can no longer hide the failure, or shirk the responsibility.

A. A. BERLE, JR.

The Loom of Youth

The Loom of Youth, by Alec Waugh. New York: George H. Doran Co.

HERE we have a novel of English Public School life written by a youth of seventeen and introduced by Mr. Thomas Seccombe. A very evident sincerity and an infinite patience in the transcription of details give a value to this book altogether greater than that of most of the innumerable books about Harrow, Eton, and other similar institutions, while the thoughtful antagonism to the school god of athleticism is in welcome contrast to Stalky and Co. It is possible, one hopes, that Mr. Waugh's story, written as it was immediately after leaving just such a school as it describes and so evidently grounded upon long experience and thorough knowledge of the situation, may be influential

upon the discussion of education at present so much to the fore in England.

To an American who has had personal and delightful experience of the relationship existing between masters and pupils in two of our great boarding schools, the picture presented of the attitude of English boys of a like station in life towards their instructors comes as something of a shock. The life is one perpetual round of lying, cribbing, sneaking and evasions of discipline. A master whose classroom was so incredibly disorderly as Mr. Trundle's would be promptly dismissed from any good American school. The whole "atmosphere" is different. This contrast is pointed out not in spirit of patriotic priggishness but as a mere fact.

For a "first novel" the style of *The Loom of Youth* is singularly round and full; the ingenuousness is gladly accepted as a sign that the writer, though of the twentieth century and, therefore, a "wise youth," is still young. There is self-consciousness in the elaborate "literary flavor" imparted to the book by frequent allusions to Compton Mackenzie, Gilbert Cannan, and other modern "classics." In the mind of Mr. Waugh, Rupert Brooke already belongs to the past, Swinburne to antiquity. The technique is more hesitating and follows, perhaps inevitably, the now conventional course—popularized by Mr. Wells and adopted by Mr. Ervine and so many others—of an elaborate portrayal of life "before the war" with the looming up of the clouds of conflict, the slow consequent deepening of the young men's view of life, and their departure for service to their country. Another motive familiar to the novel-reader, and one that some such readers have perhaps learned to distrust, appears here in a minor key: the idea of devotion to Beauty as a solution of the difficulties of modern life. Possibly it is such a solution; but not probably. The gradual dawning of the love of great literature upon Gordon Caruthers (the hero of the tale) occasions, however, some acute and suggestive observations upon the means whereby an old and somewhat stale curriculum may be brought more closely into touch with life. The publishers are justified in following the example of England in advertising the "remarkable promise" of this book.

S. C. C.

A Correction

In the book review, *What the Workers Want*, in our issue of June 9th, on page 65, 1st column, 49th line, Mr. Smithe should read Mr. Smillie. On the same page in the 2nd column, 11th line, Mr. Havelock Ellis should read Mr. Havelock Wilson.

The Index for Volume XXII which was completed with our issue No. 286, has been printed separately. It will be mailed on request, post free, to any subscriber who will send his name and address on a post card directed to the New Republic, 421 West 21st St., New York City.

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